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Chapter 2: Media Consumption and Public Connection  
 
 
Why media consumption? 
In Chapter 1, we reviewed the debates regarding the basis of the public’s engagement 
with democratic politics. We observed that, while there are many explanations of the 
so-called crisis in democracy, these generally focus on changes in political institutions 
and social structures; much less often is serious attention paid to the media. Yet at the 
heart of many of these explanations lies a set of assumptions about people’s ‘public 
connection’ – their lived relationship with public culture – which make little sense 
unless grounded in the material realities of people’s daily lives. Firmly embedded in 
these material realities are the symbolic realities of the media (Couldry 2005a; 
Silverstone 2005).1 
We also began to map out some key processes now shaping public connection, 
particularly the putative shift away from ‘traditional’ politics towards single-issue or 
life-style politics, the decline in public trust in democratic institutions, and the 
increasingly contested boundary between public and private. Media are highly 
relevant to each since so much that is ‘political’ or ‘public’ is presented through 
media. Indeed as Putnam (2000: 218) notes, ‘newspaper reading and good citizenship 
go together’, while according to the British Social Attitudes survey, alongside a 
‘gradual erosion’ of trust in government through the 1990s, people’s willingness to 
contact the media is the only form of political action that has increased (Bromley et al. 
2004).2 
Attracting and sustaining citizens’ attention is a central challenge in modern 
democracies and a prerequisite for most political or civic action, from opinion 
formation or public discussion to voting or direct participation in democratic 
institutions. But how such attention is managed raises important questions, 
particularly since this attention is likely to be uneven, and perhaps also unequally 
distributed. This complexity is compounded by the contestability of the public/private 
boundary itself. We thus join with a growing number of scholars who are interested in 
how the transitions across boundaries (from personal to political, from opinion to 
action, from individual to collective) are mediated, in either direction. 
This chapter will first argue against the position that simply blames the media for 
today’s supposedly high levels of political apathy. We then examine the claim that 
media can, and in some ways do, sustain collective attention. We do not advocate the 
naïve view that media consistently act as a force for the public good. Instead, if, as 
Craig Calhoun (1992: 13) put it in relation to the public sphere, ‘the public define[s] 
its discourse as focusing on all matters of common concern [and] the emerging public 
establishe[s] itself as inclusive in principle’, we wish to ask: what are these matters of 
common concern, how are they engaged by the public, how does public engagement 
 43 
relate to political participation, if at all, and how important are media in facilitating, 
shaping or impeding such participation? 
The plurality of media 
Any such analysis must start, however, from a recognition that media are plural in 
their cultural forms, modes of address, technological features and, hence, in their 
effects. We must disaggregate the generic term, ‘the media’, too easily reified in 
public, sociological and political debate. 
One aim is to acknowledge the range of opportunities for people to use media to 
engage actively with civic concerns. Beyond ‘the news’ (the main, widely valued, 
means by which public connection is mediated) are various other, less obvious means 
by which particular media genres may open up new routes to public participation. 
Another is to clarify what aspect of media is under discussion. Two frames are 
frequently confused in both popular and academic discussion. Roger Silverstone 
(1994) used the concept of double articulation to contrast the media qua material 
objects such as the television or walkman (i.e. technological objects consumed in 
particular spatio-temporal settings), with the media qua texts such as the news or the 
soap opera (i.e. symbolic messages located within particular sociocultural discourses 
and interpreted by audiences). So when, for example, research critiques ‘the media’ 
for undermining public participation, we need to be clear: is the target of this critique 
the media qua material objects – keeping people at home on the sofa, filling their ears 
so they can’t hear conversation around them, distancing them from each other in time 
and space – or the media qua texts – infusing the news with commercial values, 
reinforcing normative perspectives through the soap opera, or replacing genuine 
debate with the managed show of the phone-in? Similarly, when the claim is made 
that ‘the media’ bring the nation together, is the claim that they do this because people 
simultaneously consume the same programme, and so can share experience over the 
water cooler the next day, or is the claim that people receive the same communicative 
content and so come to share a particular perspective on the world and a language for 
discussing it? The answer is probably ‘both’, but the analysis depends greatly on 
which aspect of media we emphasise. 
Research must also disaggregate ‘the audience’.3 Murdock et al. (1995) identify three 
categories of resources – the material (income, space, etc), social (support networks 
and local expertise) and symbolic (educational and cultural competences) – which 
contextualise media consumption and which are differentially available. In charting 
the multiplication of media goods in the family home over recent decades, Sonia 
Livingstone (2002: 41–2) distinguishes between ‘media rich’ (online, digital 
television, multiple media options), ‘media average’ (computer, multichannel 
television), and ‘media poor’ (no computer, terrestrial television). While the precise 
combination of technologies continues to change, the principle of differentiation 
persists, since with each new market innovation, social stratification works to 
maintain class distinctions. Other kinds of differentiation – by gender, ethnicity, 
generation – are perhaps less predictable; in relation to media goods at home, the 
picture for gender is changing as early technophobia among women evaporates, 
largely because of the ubiquity of technology in the work- place (Wajcman 2002) 
though attitudes to other media may remain gendered (Gray 1987). The picture for 
ethnicity, at least in the United Kingdom, is complex, with some minority groups 
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being among the early adopters while others are disproportionately represented among 
the digitally excluded (Ofcom 2008). 
Similarly research on how people interpret media texts has generated a thoroughly 
differentiated conception of audiences. Social class, gender, age and so forth all shape 
audiences’ interpretative activities, and their ability to construct a meaningful world 
view that may accept but also re-interpret or resist media’s often-normative 
encoding.4 Research is now turning to the rather different tasks – increasingly framed 
as media literacy – implicated in making sense of new media, especially the internet.5  
In addition, disaggregating audiences, and adjusting the broader narrative of mass 
consumption to take account of people’s everyday responses to media, has tended to 
move audience research away from an overly media-centric approach. Being part of 
an audience is just one of many activities in daily life, and media just one of many 
sources of meaning and influence. The charge of media-centrism criticises at audience 
research for reifying its objects of analysis (‘the movie-goer’, the ‘soap fan’, ‘the 
audience’) and so blinds us to the diverse social and cultural contexts within which 
media reception is embedded. Various concepts have been proposed to counter this 
media-centrism: the ‘embedded audience’ (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998), the 
‘dispersed audience’ (Radway 1988), the ‘extended audience’ (Couldry 2005), and the 
call for ‘ethnographic’ research (Drotner 1994; Ang 1996). These debates have 
opened the way to a more contextualised approach to people’s everyday relations with 
media. 
By opening up the black boxes of ‘the media’ and ‘the audience’, the empirical 
analysis of later chapters will explore how people’s diverse, often contradictory 
participation in democracy is thoroughly mediated. 
‘The media’ – legitimate object of blame? 
Since the advent of broadcasting, opinion has been sharply divided between those 
excited by its potential to stimulate, engage and integrate, and those fearful of its 
potential to distract, disengage and fragment. Each new medium has attracted 
surprisingly similar public hopes and anxieties (Drotner 1992). 
A commonplace, pessimistic discourse about media use is that the media, especially 
television, transform the public into a passivised, individualistic, mindless mass 
audience, sapping their motivation to get off the sofa and engage. This discourse – 
familiar through such well-worn tropes such as the couch potato or telly addict – 
reinforces a highly critical view of the media. The view that the media are irrelevant 
or even harmful to democracy, and political engagement in particular, goes back to 
elite models of democracy (Lippman 1922: 63; 1925). More recently, Jürgen 
Habermas (1989) argued that the media have played a key role in undermining the 
public sphere through the ‘refeudalisation’ of public discussion into the mere 
‘publicity’ of a pseudo-public sphere. By contrast with face-to-face communication, 
where one can check whether communication is trustworthy, authentic and reliable, 
the increasing mediation of the public seems to open the door to the inauthentic, the 
motivated and the untrustworthy. 
In the lively debate following Habermas’ original thesis, many have judged the media 
to have ‘undercut the kind of public culture needed for a healthy democracy’ 
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(Dahlgren 2003: 151) by various means, including (1) keeping people at home and 
away from civic and community spaces, (2) distracting people by easy entertainment 
away from more demanding news and current affairs, (3) commodifying news into 
branded infotainment and dumbing down journalistic values, to the point where fact 
and fiction are indistinguishable within politics itself,6 and (4) focusing attention on 
the activities of the traditional (privileged) establishment and silencing difference and 
dissent.7 
A recent and influential version of those arguments is Robert Putnam’s Bowling 
Alone thesis (Putnam 2000). Noting time-use data that shows most of Americans’ 
increase in free time in the past decades has been taken up by television viewing, 
Putnam argues that high television consumption (television as entertainment, that is) 
is a major cause of declining levels of social capital and civic engagement. As he puts 
it, ‘a major commitment to television viewing – such as most of us have come to have 
– is incompatible with a major commitment to community life’; consequently, ‘just as 
television privatises our leisure time, it also privatises our civic activity, dampening 
our interactions with one another even more than it dampens individual political 
activities’ (2000: 229). 
Both Putnam’s argument and his evidence have since been widely criticised (see 
Chapter 1). Nonetheless, blaming television remains a popular explanation for the 
apparent loss of civic engagement and Putnam’s argument has been reworked 
theoretically in Henry Milner’s argument that low civic engagement is associated with 
the high know- ledge dependency associated with high TV viewers (Milner 2002). 
Yet arguments such as Putnam’s based on how we use our time, while they cannot 
easily be dismissed,8 are far from straightforward. American research based on time-
budget data (Robinson and Godbey 1997) has concluded that subjectively the US is a 
‘time-famine society’, even though the average American actually had more free time 
in the 1980s and 1990s than previously. Gershuny (2000) argues that recent years 
have seen increasing convergence in time use by gender and class in the UK, like 
many Western countries, with time ‘pressures’ increasing not because of overall hours 
spent in employment, but because a growing range of activities impinge upon leisure 
time.9 The relation of time to socio-demographics is therefore complex. 
Reasons for blaming media are, then, multiple. The risk is that blaming ‘the media’ 
without disaggregating these different claims obfuscates the broader, complex and 
codependent relations between media and society. The critique too easily loses its 
force especially as, when expressed in its simplest form, it can be sidelined as a mere 
scapegoating of the media as a convenient target, motivated either by the covert desire 
to distract attention from other likely causes of political apathy (for example, failing 
political institutions) or by an elitist disparaging of ‘ordinary’ interests (a consistent 
pitfall of arguments around the Habermasian public sphere).10 A more subtle and 
nuanced account of media’s consequences for public life is needed. 
Mediating a shared frame of attention 
If, as in much liberal thought (see Chapter 1), the public world is taken to mean that 
which is both collective and accessible (or visible), then private experience can offer 
little scope for public connection, which obscures the potential fluidity of the 
public/private boundary. While not arguing necessarily that everything private has a 
public or political significance, we do argue against the idea that everything private 
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(i.e. inaccessible to others) is without public or political significance. Why? For our 
present purposes, the main reason is the crucial positioning of the media, linking the 
private and inaccessible realm of the home (where most media are consumed) to the 
public (visible, accessible) world beyond. That, many argue, is the point of the media; 
engaging with media at home, as part of a collective audience, has long been regarded 
by media and communication scholars as potentially a public activity. 
So mediation may facilitate shared attention and, as Daniel Dayan (2005: 44) puts it, 
we need to ‘pay attention to attention’. Dayan argues that collective attention takes 
many forms: the public, but also the spectator, the activist, the witness, the 
community and the crowd. If shared attention can be constitutive of the collective, 
media may also serve to divide, fragment, silence or exclude members of collectivities 
– a question that can only be resolved through empirical exploration. 
It is widely assumed, however, that media constitute the public’s sense of its 
collective identity and community. In Europe particularly, the classic public service 
vision of electronic media as connecting community, even building the nation, has 
long been influential. The BBC’s manifesto for public service broadcasting in the 
twenty-first century proclaims that, to build ‘public value’, it must enable citizen- 
ship, strengthen social capital and connect communities (Grade 2004). Indeed, 
throughout the history of mass media,11 nations have relied upon the assumption that 
media can and do play a key constitutive role, an assumption held in fascist as well as 
democratic states and long before the advent of broadcasting.12 Paddy Scannell (1989: 
155) has argued media play a role in the ‘resocialization of private life’, while Bird 
sees media as providing the ‘cultural frame’ for everyday life (Bird 2003: 3), 
notwithstanding questions about whether media really did play such an integrative 
role in nation-building as so often now taken-for-granted (Schlesinger 2000). 
Many have agreed with this analysis but offered a much more critical reading of its 
consequences. George Gerbner’s claim that ‘television tells most of the stories to 
most of the people most of the time’ (Gerbner et al. 1986: 18) pointed to media’s 
ideological power to draw people into a normative mainstream, masking diversity and 
undermining dissent, whereas a more recent critique of (American) public service 
television challenges its distinctly middle-class vision of what it means to be a ‘good 
citizen’ (Ouellette 2002: 138). 
As we move into a new media and information environment, characterised by 
convergent, ubiquitous and interactive communication, this now-familiar agenda has 
focussed on the internet (Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2006; Livingstone 2005a). The 
internet seems to some uniquely equipped to ‘build’ community, whether a social 
cosmopolitanism (Hannerz 2002) or an enhanced deliberative democracy (Bentivegna 
2002). As one of Maria Bakardjieva’s interviewees said, the internet offers ‘a link to 
everywhere’ (Bakardjieva and Smith 2001: 76), a statement reminiscent of Robert 
Park’s comment, many years ago (Park 1984: 81, 85), that the newspaper provided a 
‘window on [the] world’ for US immigrants seeking community in the modern 
metropolis. 
A significant shift is suggested if we contrast these last two quotes: in both, the media 
are crucial to public connection, but in relation to the newspaper, the media do the 
connecting; by contrast, with the internet, citizens are the agents, for without their 
activity, the link exists only as a potential (Burbules 1998). However, if there are 
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expectations that the internet will simply ‘take over’ television’s role in connecting 
community, history suggests otherwise, for rarely do new media replace old media 
(Marvin 1988); rather, the new ‘remediates’ the old (Bolter and Grusin 2001). We do 
not know as yet whether television’s audience will further fragment (Webster 2005) 
or, perhaps, continue to provide the centre-stage for national culture, albeit an often 
mainstreamed and normative stage, leaving the internet to afford opportunities for the 
expression of diversity and difference.13 Once again we will leave the implications of 
this point open until we examine our fieldwork. 
From the collective to the public 
Television seems ‘to project its images, character types, catch-phrases and latest 
creations to the widest edges of the culture, permeating if not dominating the conduct 
of other cultural affairs’ and yet it also has ‘the powerful capacity … to draw towards 
itself and incorporate (in the process, transforming) broader aspects of the culture’ 
(Corner 1995: 5). But, even if one accepts media’s importance in attracting the public 
gaze and so setting the agenda of our shared attention, what are the implications of 
this beyond a collective experience? When is mediated connection also public 
connection? Is media consumption necessarily significant for democracy and the 
public sphere? Even if true in the past, can the media retain such a role, now the mass 
media that dominated the twentieth century are diversifying into the manifold 
interactive media of the 21st century? 
One way forward is to argue that conceptually ‘the collective’ and ‘the public’ are one 
and the same. But this fails to capture the normative expectations held of the public, 
especially by theories of democracy (Taylor 2004: see Chapter 1 above). In seeking to 
distinguish the two, Daniel Dayan (2005) argues for a conception of the ‘public’ that 
goes beyond mere common experience. ‘A public’ must engage in actions that 
constitute a visible performance – it must take action, and it must be seen to do so. 
Further, it must be seen by itself to act, for a public (unlike, say, a crowd or a 
community) is reflexive: ‘a public not only offers attention, it calls for attention’. 
Forming or joining a public takes commitment; it is not entered into lightly, for once 
joined, the public is imagined by its participants in the first person, as ‘we’. 
The publics in which ordinary people, in their daily lives, might participate – the ‘we’ 
that is open to them to join – include ‘the general public’ or ‘the nation’, but also 
various counter-publics, local publics or subcultural publics. These may not always 
meet Dayan’s normative standards but they do, nonetheless, represent a range of ways 
in which people experience and enact a connection to the public. To allow for this 
range, our phrase, ‘public connection’, repositions ‘public’ as an adjective rather than 
a reified (or idealised) noun. Degrees and types of publicness may, thus, vary; indeed, 
the nature of public connection is, for us, an open question, inviting empirical 
exploration. 
Developing Dayan’s analysis also helps to reveal media’s potential role. The media 
provide a means, perhaps the key means in late modern society, not only for offering 
but also calling for attention. Media are frequently reflexive and are engaged with 
reflexively by their audiences. 
Media choices reflect a certain degree of commitment, as a form of identity display, 
not least to oneself, although as a corollary we must realise that media exclude as well 
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as include. As Mirca Madianou (2005) observes, in Greece the ‘national’ news 
presumes the public to be Greek, thus discursively excluding the Turkish-speaking 
minority in a manner strongly felt by that subsection of the audience who, in their 
turn, ‘switch off’, simultaneously switching on to an alternative form of news and, so, 
to a potentially subcultural public. Research indicates that levels of mistrust in media 
are much higher in UK certain ethnic minorities than the general UK population 
(Ofcom 2006a). More generally, as critical scholarship has long made plain, it is 
endemic to news discourse that it divides the world variously into ‘us’ and ‘them’.14 
That qualification aside, what grounding in democratic theory can be found for these 
claims that media sustain the public’s attention? First, John Dewey’s argument 
(Dewey 1946: 114–15) that tradition- ally, citizens’ duties have been threefold – to 
vote, participate in the social life of the community and communicate, expressing 
opinion and discussing issues of the day, and so communications (‘shared 
experience’) provide the basis of democratic revival. Barnhurst (2000) however 
suggests that for young people in the early 21st century, these duties are perceived 
and enacted differently and now encompass various types of expressive and resistant 
identity, in which media are variously involved. T. H. Marshall’s (1992: 44) 
argument, that citizenship relies on the ‘extension of common culture and common 
experience’, like Dewey’s, makes no specific mention of media institutions, though 
Raymond Williams (1961) draws out Marshall’s implicit assumption that media play 
a central role in sustaining a ‘common culture’, providing ‘representations of what 
living is now like’ (Williams 1976). Scannell (1989) emphasises the role of 20th 
century national broadcasting in generating a new ‘communicative entitlement’ for 
whole populations. However, with the notable exception of Habermas’ (1989, 1996) 
initially negative and later more positive reading of media’s contribution to 
democratic engagement, most political theory has given media limited explicit 
attention until recently. 
It is much easier to find examples of the assumption of mediated political connection 
in political science,15 even if the nature of media’s role remains little explicated.16 But 
if it has only become common recently within mainstream political science to be 
explicit about media’s contribution to public connection, the sub-discipline of 
‘political communication’ research, is premised precisely on the salience of mediated 
political connection;17 we draw on insights from this field in what follows. 
The traditional centrality of the news 
For most people, the media are the main source of news about political matters 
(Electoral Commission 2008) and, notwithstanding the media environment’s 
diversification, television remains ‘the main source’18 of news, cited as such by 2 in 3 
British adults (Ofcom 2006). The same survey finds that nearly 4 in 5 trust television 
to provide fair and unbiased news, though interestingly those of higher socio-
economic status are less likely to prioritise television news (preferring newspapers or 
radio). 
In part, such high trust reflects people’s acknowledged dependency on television news 
at times of conflict or crisis, especially international crisis.19 At such times, people 
may have complex and ambivalent responses to media images of global suffering over 
which audiences have little control (Hoijer 2004), while also being critical of the 
coverage (Michalski et al. 2002). 
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Under more everyday circumstances, however, and notwithstanding generally high 
levels of public trust in the objectivity of television news, there are many uncertainties 
whether people accept, or even under- stand, the news. Research consistently shows 
that few can recall many of the news items watched just a few minutes before, and 
that many confuse, or misunderstand key aspects of the message content.20 Key 
barriers to understanding include the use of technical terms, lack of context or 
explanation for events, the rapidly shifting news agenda, and mismatches between 
visual and verbal information. These are increasingly being raised in policy contexts 
as ‘media literacy’ questions, though this shifts responsibility from producer to 
receiver,21 a problem when news is institutionally organised according to priorities 
that often do not match those of the citizen.22 
Understanding presumably influences decisions over trustworthiness. The 2004 
British Social Attitudes survey found that while 65 per cent of broadband users trust 
the internet as a source of news (the same proportion that trust newspapers), the 
balance is different among potential internet users and non-users who trust both the 
internet and newspapers less overall; in particular the internet is a much less trusted 
medium among non users (59 per cent trusting newspapers versus 19 per cent internet 
news) (Bromley et al. 2004). Pew (2004: 33) also reports considerable scepticism 
towards news sources among the American public, with 53 per cent agreeing that they 
‘often don’t trust what news organisations are saying’. However, all this begs the 
question, does greater trust indicate higher or lower levels of media literacy? Is there a 
‘right answer’ to the question: ‘how much of the time can you trust newspapers’? One 
American study (Tsfati 2003: 65) found that: ‘when people did not trust the media, 
they tended to reject the mediated climate of opinion. On the other hand, when people 
had faith in the media, they tended to consistently converge with the media’s election 
predictions’. 
Understanding and trust is not simply a matter of the public’s ‘media literacy’. In a 
survey for the BBC among 16–44 year olds, it was argued that not only does the 
public ‘find it difficult to relate politics and its presentation to their everyday lives’ 
but also ‘more media, in all forms, can mean more coverage but less clarity’, 
especially as ‘many people do not have a grasp of the basics of on-going political and 
news issues … or even democracy’s structure and workings’ (BBC 2002: 4; see also 
Hargreaves and Thomas (2002: 4)). These reports suggest a failure of news media as 
much, or more than, a failure of the public. Further, when people distrust media 
representations, they may either seek out a wider range of information sources or 
‘dismiss coverage’ altogether (Reilly 1999). The latter rejection is more characteristic 
of lower socio- economic status, ethnic minority and marginalised populations.23 
In short, people’s interest in news is shaped by whether or not they understand it, and 
understanding depends on the form of the news, and the ways in which it addresses 
people. Research shows that if audiences do not understand, they lose interest and 
become disengaged (Graber 2001). Hargreaves and Thomas’ (2002) study identified 
‘a strong demand for clear direct explanations from journalists which cut through 
‘waffle’ and ‘spin’ and which explained why these events were happening’ (Philo and 
Berry 2004: 257). Greg Philo and Michael Berry also found that people were more 
engaged (and understood news reports better) if they could empathise with the people 
depicted, or there were common values in the news to which they could relate. But, 
recalling Putnam’s argument, Ron Lembo (2000) has suggested the ‘sociality’ of TV 
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for many adults is comparatively ‘disengaged’, requiring the news to overcome such 
disengagement if it is to sustain public connection. 
Yet far from media seeking to overcome disengagement, some research points to 
media institutions ever more motivated to communicate with themselves, and with 
society’s elites (Raboy 1992: 142). Nick Couldry’s work (2003a) sees the idea of 
media as socially integrative as a myth whose relationship to social reality cannot be 
assumed. Taking a different tack, Nina Eliasoph (1998) seeks to understand the role 
of apathy in everyday life, through the patterning of everyday talk and action, where 
people may want ‘to create a sense of community, but [do] not want to talk politics’ – 
precisely the problem in moving from the collective or civic to the political that we 
saw in another context at the end of Chapter 1. 
For young people particularly, the internet is becoming an increasingly important 
source of news, raising new questions about people’s skills in locating, comparing and 
critically evaluating an expanding range of news sources, many of which lack 
traditional gatekeepers or editorial quality checks. The ‘UK Children Go Online’ 
survey found that 24 per cent of UK teenagers read the news online (Livingstone and 
Bober 2004), while the Electoral Commission (2008) found that 25 per cent of 25–30 
year olds turn to the internet as a major source of political and current affairs news, 
compared to just 4 per cent of those are 55 years. However, Pew internet surveys 
(2000, 2002a, 2004) suggest that young people’s interest in the internet is insufficient 
to counter their generally lower levels of news consumption overall, though online 
news does now comprise a larger proportion of their news consumption than for older 
people. Reliance on the internet as news source may rise among the whole population 
during times of emergency such as the September 2001 attacks (Hamilton and Jenner 
2003: 136). Other American research also suggests that the public is increasingly 
using the internet as a news source (Eveland et al. 2004), and this is a growing trend 
also in the UK (Ofcom 2004b). Online news appears to supplement more than 
displace traditional news sources (Althaus and Tewksbury 2000), and since many rely 
on the main news ‘brands’, the content thus obtained does not differ greatly from 
broadcast news (Tewksbury 2003). Research on the internet, however, is still in its 
early phases, and our research will make no a priori assumptions about the internet’s 
importance for ordinary people in their daily lives. 
Moving beyond claims that the public is irrational, news media simply irresponsible, 
or that the internet will solve the problems in the media- citizen relation, we need a 
complex account that relates media consumption to public connection in multiple 
ways. 
Engaging with media in late modernity 
The very factors that threaten the taken-for-granted centrality of traditional routes to 
mediated public connection may point, simultaneously, to new routes. Crucial here is 
the increasing individualisation in society, including the individualisation of media 
use, especially among young people. ‘Individualisation’ refers to a continuing process 
not a radical break, proposing that traditional social distinctions (social class, but also 
gender, ethnicity, region) are declining in importance, resulting in a fragmentation or 
undermining of the norms and values which have, hitherto, defined how people live 
their lives.24 Regarded critically, this arouses popular fears of the selfish, ‘me-
generation’. More positively, it suggests new freedoms through self-actualisation and 
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intensified reflexivity. 
In terms of media consumption, one may point to the gradual fragmentation of 
audiences for the main terrestrial channels in a multichannel environment (Webster 
2005), to the multiplication of media goods and increasing independence of time-
schedules within the household (Livingstone 2002), and to the gradual displacement 
of mass media (television especially) by the internet, mobile and digital media 
(UCLA 2003). Observers of recent media history predict that the long-term 
consequences of media will be further to stratify (Dahlgren 2001: 83), fragment 
(Lievrouw 2001; Sunstein 2001) or polarise (Jones 2002) lifeworlds, not integrate 
them. Alternatively more diverse media content, together with the rise in creative or 
user-generated content, may facilitate the project of the self. 
However we resolve this, media’s mode of address is clearly changing as we move 
from a mass mediated to an increasingly multi-mediated culture. Media have never 
addressed all parts of the population equally: the press never tried, television tried but 
failed for many decades though public service retains such an ambition (Grade 2004); 
while the internet is built on the assumption of diversity and heterogeneity. Audience 
research strongly suggests that audiences are, in practice, just as disaggregated as we 
already know media organisations, texts and technologies to be (Livingstone 1998). 
Even the exceptional case of a national or global ‘media event’ (Dayan and Katz 
1992) – a coronation or royal funeral, a major football game, even the finale of Big 
Brother – may have audiences that are more heterogeneous, diverse, stratified than we 
first suppose (Turnock 2000; Couldry 2003a). Indeed, it is a standard finding that 
audiences – or media consumers – acquire, make choices about, and interpret media 
texts and technologies in a manner strongly shaped by their sociodemographic 
background (social class, gender, age, ethnicity) and individual life history. In this 
regard, media consumption is part of the broader analysis of mass consumption that 
seeks to understand the complex ways in which people choose, interpret and 
appropriate goods within their daily lives (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 
1990: 139). 
In any case we are concerned in this book with more than convergent national habits 
of media consumption, even if to some extent they persist. For such convergent 
consumption may not be focused on media that link to the world of public issues. 
What if media connection is mainly used by most people for entertainment genres, not 
news, so that the presumption of ‘public connection’ is unfounded (Morley 1999: 139, 
152)? 
When addressing such concerns, the research literature often finds itself challenging 
the boundaries of the political. A case has been made, across a wide range of 
entertainment genres – the soap opera, the talk show, music and, most recently, sports 
– that these too may provide a basis for what we are here calling public connection. 
The argument is not, generally, made in terms of a shared knowledge of political 
facts, but rests on claims regarding identity and life-politics (gender, ethnicity, age), 
on mobilising shared emotional connection, and making visible the lived reality of 
ordinary people (especially the poor, the marginalised and those usually denied a 
voice in traditional political formats).25 We take such arguments seriously: now that 
the public agenda is preoccupied by contentious issues once considered private, ‘such 
as affirmative action, abortion, and the rights of sexual minorities … issues about 
which large publics are either disinterested or unalterably divided’ (Bennett 1998), 
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who is to say that the treatment of such issues in a soap opera is any less influential 
than its treatment by the news? But the empirical question remains: how effectively 
are such genres linked to ‘the political’ in the broadest sense (that is, the world of 
public deliberation and public action)? For public connection is more than a matter of 
expressing belonging to a specific community (see Chapter 1). 
One area of entertainment where, in principle, we might expect such links to a broader 
public agenda is celebrity culture. Celebrities, we are often told, are role models for 
millions, especially younger citizens; the detailed narratives of celebrity lives – their 
struggles over identity, sexuality, giving birth, performing in public – certainly 
fascinate many of us. And celebrities are increasingly involved in, and used by 
politicians to further, political narratives, as part of a general blurring of the boundary 
between news and entertainment (Delli Carpini and Williams 2001). From here, some 
have made a stronger case, that celebrity culture is an essential component of public 
debate about the issues which require public resolution, whether as part of an 
increasing personalization of politics (Corner 2003), or as part of a broader 
narrativisation of democracy that includes a wider section of the public (Hartley 1999; 
Lumby 1997). This contradicts a longer negative tradition which sees celebrities and 
the mediated events constructed around them, as pseudo-personalities and pseudo-
events (Boorstin 1961). But such is the proliferation of celebrity culture (Rojek 2001; 
Turner 2004) that it can no longer simply be dismissed as external to the world of 
public issues. We have taken an open view on this question: we asked our diarists to 
talk, as they thought relevant, about celebrity and other aspects of popular media 
culture, and then looked for any connections they made with issues of public 
contention. 
In contemporary large-scale democracies, it would be absurd to ignore media’s 
potential contribution to democracy as both information sources and foci of public 
attention and orientation. But the key question is: how are such possibilities enacted 
and embedded within the broader structuring of daily life, and how are such 
possibilities perhaps now being transformed? 
New and emerging sites of mediated public connection 
In the face of voter apathy and the supposed decline of civil society, we are 
witnessing a range of initiatives to engage audiences in public fora, often aided by 
new technological forms of interactive and participatory media. The familiar, mass 
communication model – with its centralised organisation, elite gatekeepers and 
established relations with institutions of power – no longer has a monopoly, with new 
opportunities emerging for the public to communicate, connect and deliberate online 
(Delli Carpini and Williams 2001; Lievrouw and Livingstone 2006). Following 
Habermas’ later work, Sara Bentivegna (2002) argues that the internet is ‘democratic’ 
in that, while each of its features (interactivity, facilitated horizontal communication, 
disintermediation, reduced entry costs for small groups/individuals, and increased 
speed and flexibility of transmission and circulation) are not intrinsically new, when 
combined they enable the internet to introduce a qualitative shift in the potential for 
democratic communication. 
Governments appear optimistic that civic or political participation can be thus 
revitalised, supporting a variety of mediated initiatives in relation to cultural 
citizenship, political socialisation, participatory deliberation, e-democracy, the digital 
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divide, citizen engagement, and so forth (Bentivegna 2002; Coleman 2005; 
Livingstone 2005b). At present, however, evaluations of these initiatives are less than 
optimistic (Liff and Stewart 2001; Phipps 2000). An American survey of 15–25 year 
olds found that the internet to be even less effective than traditional means of 
engaging disaffected young people though very effective at mobilising the already-
interested (Levine and Lopez 2004) while a survey of UK teenagers (Livingstone et 
al. 2005) found that those from more privileged homes, and with higher quality 
internet access, were better positioned to take up civic information available online 
(see also Ofcom 2009). 
It is important here to avoid polarising the (passive, mass) audience and the (active, 
collectivist) public. After all, they may be the same people, and such a binary 
opposition blinds us to the complexity of people’s relations with media and, so, to 
ways in which media consumption may sometimes work for the democratic cause. 
The growth of borderline public/private phenomena across both traditional and new 
media are important complications here, whether talk shows (private issues aired in 
the public television studio), internet chatrooms (publicly visible discussion accessed 
from private bedrooms), or voting in media contests or commenting on the news via 
text message (participation at a distance);26 the BBC’s Action Network27 was another 
interesting development. Without overstating their consequences, these new genres at 
least ‘create a space for us to understand each other. Such understanding stops short 
of real political efficacy. But it does contribute to democratising the discourse of 
news’ (Lewis et al. 2005: 89). 
There is evidence also that citizens are challenging more established media for the 
right to interpret public discourse, particularly through citizen-created online 
magazines or the much-vaunted ‘blogs’ (Boczkowski 2004). In the US particularly, 
bloggers have been influential in, for example, securing the resignation of Republican 
Senate majority leader Trent Lott (Cornfeld 2005; Drezner and Farrell 2004a; Regan 
2004). Some have suggested that they constitute a new kind of governing institution, a 
‘fifth estate’ that ‘keeps watch over the main- stream media’ (Drezner and Farrell 
2004b), while the argument that computer-mediated communication provides 
intrinsically new possibilities for the general public and specialised groups to connect 
and debate is at least a decade old (Rheingold 1995). Yet there are good reasons to be 
cautious in the face of such optimism. One American survey found that only 17 per 
cent said online news led to them being exposed to a wider range of political opinion 
(Pew 2003). The ‘blogosphere’ may in large part be an elite phenomenon: in the US 
there is evidence that media elites including leading editors, publishers, political 
reporters and influential columnists all read blogs, and when 140 editors, reporters, 
columnists and publishers responded to a survey about which blogs they read, the top 
10 blogs were responsible for 54 per cent of the citations, and the skew was even 
more marked among ‘elite’ publications (Drezner and Farrell 2004a). The authors 
caution that: 
To the extent that blogs become more politically influential, we may expect 
them to become more directly integrated into ‘politics as usual,’ losing some of 
their flavor of novelty and immediacy in the process. The most recent evidence 
of co-option was the decision by both major parties to credential some bloggers 
as journalists for their nominating conventions. (Drezner and Farrell 2004a). 
Commentators on the many experiments in e-democracy (Tsagarousianou etal. 1998) 
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similarly observe that it appears easier to attract the already-interested or politically 
active than draw in new initiates to democratic deliberation: consequently, initiatives 
directed at the marginalised risk instead further advantaging the privileged. 
One must ask not only about whether online information will improve the quality of 
public connection but also, more broadly, about the prospects for civil society online 
(and, indeed, offline). Steve Jones (1997: 25) suggested some time ago that the 
internet contributes to the fracturing of social realities, while Pippa Norris (2000: 277; 
Norris 2001) argues that the internet is likely to intensify the ‘democratic divide’ 
between ‘those who do and do not use the multiple political resources available on the 
internet for civic engagement’. Thus Michael Bimber (quoted in Lievrouw and 
Livingstone 2002: 54) fears that the internet is producing the ‘democratisation of 
elites’. Meanwhile James Katz and Ronald Rice (2002: 150)28 conclude in their 
survey of the internet’s social consequences that: 
even with higher bandwidth and richer format, [the internet] does not fit well 
with the way people get politically socialized. Rather it is our view that the 
Internet is a form of syntopia – an extension of, but still heavily integrated with 
other face-to-face and media channels and processes. 
 
All this is without taking into account the online strategies of existing power groups: 
Robert McChesney (2000) charts the growing power over the internet of dominant 
commercial players, reducing the diversity of voices that get heard online, while 
Anthony Wilhelm (2000) complains that online politics takes the form of 
monologues, not dialogue. This is echoed by young people when they complain that 
online they are invited to ‘have their say’ yet rarely are listened to (Livingstone and 
Bober 2004; Livingstone 2009). Interestingly, following the successful use of the 
internet in the 2008 US election, Pew internet reports that online citizens also expect 
to be active in the Obama administration (Smith 2008). 
We return here to the suggestion at the end of Chapter 1: that even enhanced civic 
engagement and mediated public connection will mean little unless on a larger scale it 
contributes to people’s possibilities of effective action, which means government 
responding to the conversation as well. 
Conclusion 
As throughout this chapter, the best response to such complexities and ambiguities 
about digital inclusion/ exclusion is further empirical research. We have tried to show 
that, notwithstanding many uncertainties and doubts, the idea of ‘mediated 
connection’ – that media consumption sustains, in crucial respects, the shared 
attention of whole populations within, and perhaps now, beyond, national borders – 
remains pervasive and important. But what empirical support is there for this idea? 
How is it enacted in people’s lives? 
 
In Chapter 3, we ask specifically: how can such broad questions be translated into an 
empirical programme of research? 
 
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 56 
  
 
                                                 
1 On most measures, media’s role in our lives goes on increasing. For UK data on the 
acquisition of media goods over decades, see MacKay (1997), for US data on television 
viewing over recent decades, see Robinson and Godbey (1997). There are some exceptions, 
of course, notably signs that in the US time spent on the internet may be displacing time spent 
viewing television (USC 2004).  
2 Although it remains at a low level (3.9 % of population) (National Centre for Social 
Research 2006).  
3 Alasuutari (1999; Livingstone (2005a). 
4 Morley (1986); Press (1991). 
5 Snyder (1998); Kress (2003); Livingstone (2004); Jensen (2005). 
6 Delli Carpini and Williams (2001). 
7 McChesney (2000). 
8 See Hirschman (1982) on political scientists’ underestimation of the time  necessary for 
political involvement, Verba etal. (1995) on time as a key determinant of higher voluntary 
participation, and Croteau (1995) on the lack of time left over from work for working-class 
families.  
9 Cf van Frissen (2000) on dual income families’ sense of living in the ‘rush hour of life’.  
10 Calhoun (1992), Fraser (1990). 
11 Reith (1924: 219), Arnheim (1943), Rath (1989), Lacey (1996). 
12 Anderson and Levin (1976), Gellner (1983). Compare early 20th century  accounts of 
sociality in the modern city (Park 1984).  
13 Contrast Bentivegna (2002) and Luke (2006). 
14 van Dijk (1988), Liebes (1992), Gamson (1998). 
15 See Norris’ ‘virtuous circle’ argument (Norris 2000) and earlier research on  ‘the 
knowledge gap’, namely, the more you already know, the more the media inform you, and 
vice versa (Ettema et al. 1983).  
16 Street (1994). 
17 Delli Carpini and Keater (1996), Cappella and Hall Jamieson (1997), Graber  (2001).  
18 Robinson and Levy (1986). 
19 Ball-Rokeach (1985), Cohen et al. (1990), Sancho (2003). 
20 Graber (2001), Robinson and Levy (1986). 
21 Berg and Wenner (2004), Livingstone et al. (2008). 
22 Lewis et al. (2005). 
23 Croteau (1995), Hargreaves and Thomas (2002), Michalski etal. (2002),  M orley (1992), 
Towler (2001).  
24 See, for example, the writings of Beck (1992), Reimer (1995) and Ziehe  (1994). M ore 
critical positions regarding the individualisation of youth  culture are developed in Lieberg 
(1995) and Pollock (1997).  
25 Livingstone and Lunt (1994), Hermes and Stello (2000), Costera Meijer  (1997), van 
Zoonen (2001), Coleman (2003).  
26 Coleman (2005), Gamson (1992), Livingstone and Lunt (1994), Shattuc  (1997). C f. 
Drotner (2005) on the potential of mobile telephony generally.  
27 Previously called iCAN, this provided an online public forum and resource  site for civic 
activism: www.bbc.co.uk/dna/actionnetwork.  
28 Castells (2001: 118) and Gandy (2002) on the instrumental nature of  online use.  
 
